Louisiana Law Review
Volume 81
Number 4 Summer 2021

Article 14

6-2-2021

The Underbelly of the Criminal Justice System: A Critique and
Proposed Reforms of Parole Hearings in Louisiana
Brittany E. Williams

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Brittany E. Williams, The Underbelly of the Criminal Justice System: A Critique and Proposed Reforms of
Parole Hearings in Louisiana, 81 La. L. Rev. (2021)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol81/iss4/14

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

The Underbelly of the Criminal Justice System: A
Critique and Proposed Reforms of Parole Hearings in
Louisiana
Brittany E. Williams*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................ 1570
I.

Louisiana’s Problematic Parole System ..................................... 1574
A. Louisiana’s Board of Pardons and Parole............................ 1575
B. Parole, Not Freedom............................................................ 1576
C. Parole Hearings and What to Expect ................................... 1576
D. Parole in Practice ................................................................. 1578
1. Before the Parole Hearing ............................................. 1578
2. During the Parole Hearing............................................. 1579
E. Recent Legislative Changes to
Criminal Justice and Reform ............................................... 1581

II.

The Parole Process: How the Procedure
Disregards the Purpose............................................................... 1582
A. The Inmate Starts Out Behind Before
the Hearing Even Begins ..................................................... 1582
B. Why Let the Committee Do a Job the Risk
Assessment Tools Can Do More Accurately? ..................... 1584
C. Law Enforcement and Victim Impact
Statements—Good in Theory, Bad in Practice.................... 1586
1. Reducing Costs at the Expense of Fairness:
Face-to-Face versus Video Conference......................... 1587
2. Effects of the Lack of Evidentiary Rules
during Parole Hearings.................................................. 1589
a. Effects of Miller v. Alabama on Victim
and Law Enforcement Testimony........................... 1590
3. Tipping the Scale: The Weight Given to
Victim and Law Enforcement Opposition .................... 1593

Copyright 2021, by BRITTANY E. WILLIAMS.
* J.D. candidate 2021, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
I would like to specially thank my advisor, Professor Robert E. Lancaster, for his
invaluable insight and guidance throughout the writing process. I would also like
to thank my family and friends for their unending love and support in all of my
endeavors.

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 461

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1570

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

III. A Game of Give and Take: Proposed Parole
Hearing Reform.......................................................................... 1595
A. Pre-Parole Investigation....................................................... 1596
B. Risk Assessment Tools and Static Factors .......................... 1598
C. Law Enforcement and Victim Opposition:
Changing, Not Removing Their Voices .............................. 1600
1. Victims or Victim’s Family:
Conditions, Not Decisions............................................. 1601
2. Prosecutors and Other Law
Enforcement Agencies .................................................. 1602
3. Video Conference.......................................................... 1604
D. “Guess Who’s Back, Back Again” ...................................... 1605
Conclusion.................................................................................. 1605
INTRODUCTION
Imagine spending so many years in prison that when the guards take
your shackles off, you still walk as if you had them on. This is the story of
Henry Montgomery, Louisiana’s longest-serving “juvenile lifer.”1 Henry
Montgomery is a 74-year-old man and the namesake of the landmark U.S.
Supreme Court case, Montgomery v. Louisiana.2 Although the Supreme
Court found that Mr. Montgomery’s life sentence was unconstitutional and
that the court must award him the opportunity for parole, the Committee
on Parole denied his request, for the second time, in April of 2019.3

1. THE PAROLE PROJECT, https://www.paroleproject.org [https://perma
.cc/A2HX-6SXD] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). A “juvenile lifer” is a person who
was convicted of life without parole as a juvenile. FAQ, THE PAROLE PROJECT,
https://www.paroleproject.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/XK35-9NKF] (last visited
Oct. 20, 2019).
2. 577 U.S. 190 (2016). The Court held that its previous ruling in Miller v.
Alabama, that a mandatory life sentence without parole should not apply to
persons convicted as juveniles, should apply retroactively. Id. at 732 (citing Miller
v. Alabama, 577 U.S. 460, 479 (2012)).
3. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016); Katy Reckdahl, Inmate
from Supreme Court Case Rejected for Parole a Second Time, JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Apr. 13, 2019), https://jjie.org/2019/04/13/inmatefrom-supreme-court-case-rejected-for-parole-a-second-time/ [https://perma.cc/G
432-ZHK4].
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Mr. Montgomery has a low IQ and struggles with expressing himself.4
He is hard of hearing and wears a prison-issued hearing aid—“a box
hanging from his neck that resemble[s] a ‘repurposed cassette-tape
player.’”5 Mr. Montgomery was only 17 years old when a court sentenced
him to life without parole in 1963.6 He was incarcerated for 54 years before
his first parole hearing in February of 2018.7 Mr. Montgomery participated
in the parole hearing via video conference, and the Committee voted 2-1
in favor of denying parole.8 James Kuhn, the chairman of the Committee
at the time, and one of the denial votes, told Mr. Montgomery that “[the
Committee] has extraordinary discretion.”9 Using that discretion, the two
members who voted against granting Mr. Montgomery parole cited a “lack
of classes” to explain why Mr. Montgomery should not be granted
parole.10
After the hearing, Keith Nordyke, Mr. Montgomery’s lawyer,
explained that “only looking at such classes is . . . unfair.”11 According to
Mr. Nordyke, for the first 30 years of Mr. Montgomery’s sentence, inmates
serving life sentences at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, better known as
Angola, were not able to take classes.12 These classes13 include job skills
and employment readiness courses, faith-based and values development
programming, substance abuse treatment, and educational courses that are
presently available to inmates.14
At the time the courses became available to inmates serving life
sentences, a certified educator deemed Mr. Montgomery incapable of
4. Liliana Segura, Henry Montgomery Paved the Way for Other Juvenile
Lifers to go Free. Now 72, He May Never Get the Same Chance., THE INTERCEPT
(June 2, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/06/02/henry-montgomery-juvenilelife-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/DY2E-SR9K].
5. Id.
6. Grace Toohey, Board Denies Parole to Man Who Served More Than 50
Years after Killing Deputy When He Was Juvenile, THE ADVOCATE (Feb. 19,
2018), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_acca953e1579-11e8-aa66-1b036f45b902.html [https://perma.cc/7HDE-547Z].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The parole board uses the terms “classes” and “programming”
interchangeably; they mean the same thing.
14. Reentry Programming, LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY AND CORR.,
https://doc.louisiana.gov/reentry-programming
[https://perma.cc/KP5S-89JS]
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 463

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1572

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

receiving his GED and, as a result, Mr. Montgomery shifted his focus to
job training.15 He worked at the silk-screen shop at Angola for 20 years
and earned employee of the month eight times.16 Further, the two classes
Mr. Montgomery did complete, he completed as an older man, in addition
to working a full day at the shop.17 Beyond the classes, Mr. Montgomery
founded a boxing association in the prison, attended church regularly, had
a limited disciplinary record, and “even participated in Alcoholics
Anonymous despite never having any issues with substance abuse,
because ‘it was, at one point, the only self-help group.’”18 Despite Mr.
Montgomery doing “pretty much . . . all he could,” it still was not enough
to satisfy the Committee’s arbitrary requirements.19
At Mr. Montgomery’s second parole hearing, a hearing that he applied
for and that the Committee granted due to a procedural error in the first
one, he struggled to hear the Committee’s discussions when Brennan
Kelsey—the single “no” vote in a 2-1 decision20—told Mr. Montgomery
that, for the second time, the Committee would not grant him parole.21 Mr.
Kelsey cited a lack of programming, the same reason the first panel denied
parole, despite the other two members of the current panel deeming Mr.
Montgomery’s programming sufficient.22 One has to wonder what life for
Mr. Montgomery would look like today if the chairman of the Board of
Pardons & Parole (BPP) randomly assigned23 one of the other Committee
members to Mr. Montgomery’s hearing instead of Mr. Kelsey.24
Despite recent declines, the United States maintains the highest
incarceration rate in the world and the overall largest prison population.25
Further, Louisiana is the most incarcerated state in the most incarcerated
country in the world.26 In an effort to reduce incarceration, Louisiana
15. Toohey, supra note 6.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Mr. Montgomery’s case, like most, required a unanimous vote to grant
parole. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 514(A) (2019).
21. Segura, supra note 4.
22. Id.
23. See infra Part I.C for how the parole board is chosen for parole hearings.
24. Toohey, supra note 6.
25. John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate Is at a Two-Decade Low,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank
/2018/05/02/americas-incarceration-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low/ [https://perma.
cc/4NBP-YRJV].
26. Lea Skene, Louisiana Once Again Has Nation’s Highest Imprisonment
Rate After Oklahoma Briefly Rose to the Top, THE ADVOCATE (Dec. 25, 2019),
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passed extensive criminal justice reform bills in 2017.27 The new laws
establish parole eligibility for offenders who would not have had it
otherwise.28 The laws, however, fail to address what happens beyond the
point of an inmate simply receiving a parole hearing.29
The Louisiana statutory and codal authority governing parole hearings
grant the Committee an extraordinary amount of discretion.30
Additionally, the procedural aspects of parole hearings prejudice inmates
and lean in favor of non-release, especially if there is law enforcement or
victim opposition.31 These prejudices are seen specifically in three ways.
First, the inmate does not have access to one of the most important
documents used during a parole hearing, the pre-parole investigation
(PPI), nor is he provided a method for disputing the contents of the PPI
during the hearing.32 Second, the Louisiana Administrative Code suggests
the Committee consider factors that are not indicative of an inmate’s
rehabilitation and also allows the Committee to make decisions regardless
of the suggested factors.33 Third, the role of law enforcement and victims
in parole hearings and the weight given to their testimony prejudice the
inmate in many ways.34 As a result, inmates that pose little to no risk to
society remain incarcerated, impeding Louisiana’s efforts of reducing
mass incarceration.35 Therefore, the Louisiana Legislature should amend
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.12(B) to ensure all parties have
access to the pre-parole investigation.36 Additionally, the legislature
should amend the Administrative Code articles governing parole hearings
to change the criteria that the Committee uses to make parole decisions.37
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_4dcdfe1c-213a-11ea8314-933ce786be2c.html [https://perma.cc/GZQ3-CQ7E].
27. See Adam Gelb & Elizabeth Compa, Louisiana No Longer Leads Nation
in Imprisonment Rate: New Data Show Impact of 2017 Criminal Justice Reform,
PEW TRUSTS (July 10, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/articles/2018/07/10/louisiana-no-longer-leads-nation-in-imprisonmentrate [https://perma.cc/BV2R-R53Z].
28. See Act No. 280, 2017 La. Acts 692, 712 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §
15:574.4(F) (2019)).
29. See generally id.
30. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1 (2019). See also LA. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(1)–(8) (2019).
31. See discussion infra Part II.C.
32. See discussion infra Part II.A.
33. See discussion infra Part II.B.
34. See discussion infra Part II.C.1–3.
35. See discussion infra Part II.A–C.
36. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.12(B) (2019).
37. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(1)–(8) (2019).
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Further, this amendment should change the role of law enforcement and
victims in parole hearings.38 Ultimately, this reform would (1) remove
some, but not all, of the Committee’s discretion; (2) reduce prejudice
against inmates before and during parole hearings; and (3) allow for the
release of inmates who do not pose a threat to public safety, thus furthering
Louisiana’s efforts of reducing mass incarceration.39
Part I of this Comment will provide an overview of Louisiana’s parole
system. It will explain the process and procedure of a parole hearing and
discuss Louisiana’s current state in relation to the criminal justice reform
bills that Governor John Bel Edwards signed into law in 2017. Next, Part
II will discuss the issues with Louisiana’s current laws surrounding parole
hearings and explain how the laws do not align with the purpose of parole
hearings. Finally, Part III will recommend that the Louisiana Legislature
amend the current laws governing parole hearings to align the procedure
with the purpose of parole, thus furthering the state legislature’s goal of
focusing prison space on those who pose a serious threat to public safety.
I. LOUISIANA’S PROBLEMATIC PAROLE SYSTEM
Across the country, organizations and academics are calling for states
to adopt policies that ensure consistency and fairness during the parole
hearing process.40 In all other aspects of the criminal system, from arrest
to sentencing, strict rules and standards—intended to guarantee fairness
and predictability—govern the process.41 Yet, the public and the law
relatively ignore the processes for releasing convicted felons from
prison.42 In February of 2019, the Prison Policy Initiative released a report
that graded the parole system of each state based on that state’s parole
policies and whether they promote consistency and fairness.43 Louisiana
received an F.44 Louisiana is not the only state with such a low rating, as
36 other states received either an F or F-, with only one state receiving a
B-, which was the highest score received.45

38. Id. § 102(A)(2)(a).
39. See discussion infra Part III.A–D.
40. Jorge Renaud, Grading the Parole Release Systems of All 50 States,
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/
grading_parole.html [https://perma.cc/U2YV-7EW8].
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. Wyoming is the only state that received a B-. See id.
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A. Louisiana’s Board of Pardons and Parole
The BPP is part of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (DOC). Prior to 2012, there was a Board of Parole and a Board
of Pardons, both under the DOC.46 In 2012, however, the two boards
merged47 creating the BPP.48 Within the BPP is the Board of Pardons and
the Committee on Parole.49 The governor appoints each of the seven BPP
positions.50 Of the seven BPP members, five serve on the Board of
Pardons.51 The Board of Pardons’ five members, in addition to two other
governor-appointed members, make up the Committee.52 The Committee
is solely responsible for granting or denying parole to an inmate.53
The Administrative Code requires any member appointed to the
Committee after August 1, 2014 to possess nothing less than a bachelor’s
degree from an accredited college or university and have at least five years
of experience in “corrections, law enforcement, sociology, law, education,
social work, medicine, psychology, psychiatry, or a combination
thereof.”54 In addition to experiential requirements, Committee members
must complete a comprehensive training course within 90 days of their
appointment.55 The DOC developed the training in collaboration with the
chairman of the BPP.56 The Louisiana Revised Statutes require the training
to include an emphasis on data-driven decision-making, evidence-based
practices,57 stakeholder collaboration, and recidivism reduction.58 Beyond
the initial training, each member is required to complete an additional

46. See Act No. 748, 2012 La. Acts 2949.
47. This merger was a result of Act 714 of the 2012 Legislative Session. See
Act No. 748, 2012 La. Acts 2949.
48. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2018),
https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/annual.report.2018.board_.
of_.pardons.and_.parole.pdf [https://perma.cc/28XJ-WUUF].
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, PAROLE IN LOUISIANA, https://
doc.louisiana.gov/media/1/2009/10/PAROLE-IN-LOUISIANA.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/LZ72-3UFL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
54. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 103(D) (2019).
55. Id. § 117.
56. Id.
57. “Evidence-based practices” means “practices proven through research to
reduce recidivism.” LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.2(A)(9)(b)(ii) (2019).
58. Id. § 15:574.2(A)(9)(b)(i)–(iv).
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eight hours of training annually.59 These training and educational
requirements are in place to equip the Committee to make decisions using
evidence-based practices, as the BPP’s vision statement requires.60
B. Parole, Not Freedom
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.4.1(B) states that parole is a
determination “that the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations
of a law-abiding citizen so that he can be released without detriment to the
community or to himself.”61 This, however, does not mean the prisoner is
“free.”62 The Committee recognizes that parole in Louisiana gives an
offender the opportunity to be released from prison, but that the inmate
then serves the remaining portion of his sentence in the community, under
the supervision of the DOC.63 This means that if a court sentenced an
offender to life in prison, but he is granted parole, DOC will directly
supervise the released inmate for the rest of his life.64
C. Parole Hearings and What to Expect
The DOC determines parole eligibility and provides inmates with their
eligibility date.65 Each month the DOC sends a list of inmates eligible for
parole to the Committee, who then automatically schedules hearings for
these inmates.66 The Committee usually meets in panels comprised of
three randomly assigned members for parole hearings.67 The
Administrative Code provides that the chairman of the BPP should
randomly select members in a manner that reduces the probability of the
same three people serving on a panel for two consecutive months.68 In
most cases, the Committee must vote unanimously to release an inmate on

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 117.
See LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 48.
Id. § 15:574.4.1(B).
See LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 53.
See id.
See generally id.
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 303 (2019); LA. BD. OF PARDONS &
PAROLE, supra note 53.
66. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 53.
67. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 503(A) (2019).
68. Id. § 503(C). The governor of Louisiana appoints the chairman of the
board.
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parole.69 The Administrative Code does, however, offer the possibility for
a majority vote if a set of specific conditions are met.70
In Louisiana, parole hearings take place at the DOC Headquarters
complex in Baton Rouge.71 Victims and law enforcement are able to attend
the hearing in person at this location, alongside the Committee members.72
An inmate, however, does not appear in person, but attends via video
conference from the prison.73 The hearings are open to the public;
therefore, news media, as well as educational observers, may attend the
hearings at the DOC complex.74
As for attorneys, the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel” does not
extend to parole hearings.75 The Supreme Court has refrained from
analyzing the Sixth Amendment’s application to parole hearings and has
instead determined its boundaries as it applies to other post-conviction
proceedings under due process and equal protection principles.76 Thus,

69. Id. § 514(A).
70. Id. § 514(B). The criteria include that the offender: “has not been
convicted of a crime of violence . . . or a sex offense . . . regardless of the date of
conviction;” “has not committed any major . . . offenses in the 12 consecutive
months prior to the parole hearing date;” “has completed the mandatory minimum
of 100 hours of pre-release programming . . .;” “has completed substance abuse
treatment as applicable. . . ;” “has obtained HSE credential, unless the offender
has previously obtained a high school diploma or is deemed by a certified educator
as being incapable of obtaining a HSE credential due to a learning disability;” and
“the offender has obtained a low-risk level designation determined by a validated
risk assessment instrument.” Id. § 514(B)(1)(a)–(f).
71. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, PAROLE HEARING HANDBOOK:
INFORMATION FOR VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES, https://s32082.pcdn.co/wpcontent/uploads/2019/08/Parole-Hearing-Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7SJ4VZE] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Amendment 6.7.2.3 When the Right to Counsel Applies, CONSTITUTION
ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt6-7-2-3/ALDE
_00000952/ [https://perma.cc/6QW5-DS3L].
76. Id.; see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560–70 (1974); Baxter
v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1976).
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because it is not constitutionally required, not all inmates77 have legal
representation at parole hearings.78
D. Parole in Practice
The Administrative Code is the codal authority that governs parole
decisions. As a result, parole hearings are considered administrative
hearings.79 The Administrative Code provides guidelines for the
Committee through all parts of the parole process, including pre- and postparole hearings.80
1. Before the Parole Hearing
The Administrative Code requires the Committee to consider “all
pertinent information” six months before the inmate’s eligibility date.81
This review occurs at the parole hearing.82 A hearing will not occur,
however, unless there has been a pre-parole investigation (PPI).83
Therefore, prior to a hearing, the DOC requests a PPI from the Office of
Probation and Parole.84 A probation officer in the parish where the crime
occurred then prepares the PPI.85 There are no rules or statutes mandating
what the PPI should include, and thus the contents often differ depending
on the inmate and the probation officer assigned to prepare the PPI.86 The
report typically contains: (1) identifying information for the applicant; (2)
a summary of the facts of the crime; (3) the procedural history of the case;
(4) information about the applicant’s adult and criminal records; (5)
statements from community members about the applicant’s family
77. Only inmates who can afford post-conviction attorneys or who are
represented pro-bono have counsel at parole hearings. The State does not appoint
public defenders to post-conviction proceedings because these proceedings are
not covered under the Sixth Amendment. See Amendment 6.7.2.3 When the Right
to Counsel Applies, supra note 75.
78. See generally id. (explaining that the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel”
does not apply to post-conviction proceedings).
79. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, ch. 7 (2019).
80. See id.
81. Id. § 701(B).
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Letter from James E. Boren, Attorney at Law, to Mallory C. Waller, Staff
Lawyer, Louisiana Law Institute and Judge Guy Holdridge, Director, Louisiana
Law Institute (Jan. 25, 2019) (on file with author).
85. See id.
86. See id.
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members and the applicant, if available; (6) a summary of the applicant’s
social history; and (7) a final summary section.87 The Committee, the
district attorney’s office, and other law enforcement agencies that play a
role in the hearing have access to the PPI in advance; however, Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 15:547.12(A)–(B) prohibits inmates and their counsel
from having access to the PPI.88 The prohibition serves to protect sensitive
information and speaks to the societal fear that an inmate will retaliate if
he or she knows what is said about them.89 The Committee, nonetheless,
will often question the inmate about information contained in the PPI at
the parole hearing.90
2. During the Parole Hearing
Generally, a parole hearing consists of: (1) an overview of the hearing
process with the inmate; (2) a review of the crime and sentencing dates;
(3) a review of the offender’s pre-crime life factors; (4) a review of the
offender’s incarceration record; (5) a review of the parole plan, including
residence, employment, and continued rehabilitation; (6) closing and
impact statements; and (7) a deliberation or collaboration followed by a
decision.91 The Administrative Code offers a set of guidelines that suggest
how the Committee should process all of the “pertinent information”
presented during the hearing and contained in the PPI.92 These “parole
guidelines” include (1) the nature and circumstance of the crime; (2) prior
criminal record; (3) character, social background, and emotional and
physical condition; (4) institutional adjustment; (5) police, judicial, and
community attitudes toward the offender;93 (6) parole plan; (7) program
participation; and (8) risk assessment.94 The BPP’s policy states, however,
that “the parole guidelines serve as an aid in the parole decision process
87. See id.
88. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.12(A)–(B) (2019).
89. See Interview with Robert Lancaster, Professor and Assistant Dean of
Experiential Education, Paul M. Hebert Law Ctr., in Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 31,
2019).
90. See Letter from James E. Boren to Mallory C. Waller and Judge Guy
Holdridge, supra note 84.
91. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 71, at 4.
92. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(B)–(C) (2019).
93. The Administrative Code suggests the Committee give this factor the
most weight. Id. § 701(C)(5).
94. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, BOARD POLICY 07-701, “PAROLE
DECISIONS” (Oct. 26, 2020), https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/
12/07-701-POL-PAROLE-DECISIONS.pdf [https://perma.cc/424X-8BPV].
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and the parole decision shall be at the discretion of the voting parole
panel.”95 Thus, the BPP’s policy implies that the Committee has complete
discretion to make parole decisions regardless of the result of the
suggested criteria listed above in the parole guidelines.96 In congruence
with the guidelines, once it is time for impact statements, the victim as
well as the district attorney or other law enforcement agencies may present
oral or written testimony providing their opinion on whether the
Committee should vote in favor or in opposition of granting parole.97 The
traditional rules of evidence, however, do not apply to this testimony, and
thus the testimony could potentially be irrelevant or inaccurate.98
The Committee makes a decision at the end of the hearing and
discloses the decision to the inmate at such time.99 The Committee also
provides the decision in a written form called the “parole decision
form.”100 If an inmate is denied release and would like another opportunity
for consideration, he must submit an application for a parole rehearing, in
writing, to the BPP after waiting the proper time period.101 On the other
hand, if the inmate believes either that a Committee member committed
misconduct, a Committee member made a significant procedural error, or
that “significant new evidence” arose that was unavailable during his most
recent hearing, then he may request that the Committee reconsider its
decision to deny parole.102 The Committee has not disclosed any statistics
on how many people have requested reconsiderations and how many have
been granted or denied.103 Though, attorneys who represent offenders in
parole hearings and organizations that provide representation and
assistance to offenders during the parole process opine that the BPP has
stopped granting reconsiderations.104
95. See id.
96. See id. § 701(C).
97. See id. § 102(A)(6)(a); see also id. § 510(A).
98. See LA. CODE OF EVIDENCE arts. 101, 1101 (2019).
99. Id. § 703(A).
100. Id.
101. Id. § 705(A). The proper time periods are found in Administrative Code
Title 22, Part 11, § 705(C)(3), and the time period depends on the type of crime.
102. Id. § 705(D)(2)(c)(iii).
103. See generally LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR., THE BRIEFING BOOK
(July 2020), https://www.doc.la.gov/briefing-book [https://perma.cc/VD2J8MT9] (containing statistics that the DOC publishes but not any information
about requests for reconsideration).
104. Interview with Keith Nordyke, prison law expert and parole hearing
attorney for more than 30 years, at Paul M. Hebert Law Ctr., Baton Rouge, La.
(Oct. 8, 2019); Interview with Kerry Myers, Parole Project Deputy Director, and
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E. Recent Legislative Changes to Criminal Justice and Reform
For two decades, Louisiana held the title as the leading state in
incarceration rates after adopting mandatory sentencing laws and
restrictive parole policies.105 In 2017, Louisiana Governor John Bel
Edwards signed 10 criminal justice reform bills into law.106 The new laws
were the product of two years of the Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task
Force’s work and research.107 The legislature created the task force to
develop policies and practices suited for Louisiana to improve sentencing,
promote public safety, and reduce spending.108
The newly enacted justice reform legislation had four primary
objectives: (1) “prioritize prison space for those who pose a public safety
threat;” (2) “strengthen community supervision;” (3) “eliminate barriers to
re-entry;” and (4) “reinvest prison savings to reduce recidivism, support
victims.”109 These goals are apparent in the legislation.110 For example, in
an effort to “prioritize prison space for those who pose a public safety
threat,” the legislation expanded parole eligibility for some offenders that
were not previously eligible.111 Other relevant legislation included parole
eligibility for people who served 25 years for life sentences imposed for
crimes they committed as juveniles.112 As a result of this justice reform
legislation, Louisiana did lose its long-held title as the most incarcerated
state in the country and ranked second behind Oklahoma during the year
of 2018, but is now back in first place again.113 Although the legislature
seeks to lower the incarceration rate through the justice reform legislation,

Ashleigh Dowden, Parole Project Administrative Manager, at 427 Mayflower St.,
Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 9, 2019).
105. Gelb & Compa, supra note 27.
106. Louisiana’s 2017 Criminal Justice Reforms: The Most Incarcerated State
Changes Course, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUST (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www
.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/03/louisianas-2017-cri
minal-justice-reforms [https://perma.cc/WV54-MA2D].
107. See id.
108. Id. The task force members included legislators, judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, the corrections secretary, and the
state sentencing commission chair, as well as faith leaders and victim and
community advocates. Id. The Pew Charitable Trusts and the Crime and Justice
Institute provided nonpartisan data analysis and technical assistance.
109. Id. at 4.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Gelb & Compa, supra note 27.
113. Skene, supra note 26.
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not a single recent legislative change addressed the process and procedure
for parole hearings.114
II. THE PAROLE PROCESS: HOW THE PROCEDURE DISREGARDS THE
PURPOSE
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.4.1(B) states that the Committee
shall grant parole for the best interest of society, upon the Committee’s
determination that there is “reasonable probability” that the inmate is “able
and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.”115 The focus
of the statute is on the prisoner’s willingness and ability to operate as a
“law-abiding citizen,” which speak to his or her rehabilitation since
incarceration.116 Louisiana’s parole hearing process and procedures,
however, do not align with this focus.117
A. The Inmate Starts Out Behind Before the Hearing Even Begins
The Committee relies heavily on the probation officer’s PPI.118 It is
one of the most important documents the Committee reviews in
preparation for the hearing.119 The statutory prohibition on an inmate’s
access to the PPI harms an inmate’s chance for release, as it causes
confusion and delay during the parole hearing.120 In addition, this
document poses potential constitutional problems.121
The assigned probation officer creates the PPI, but there is no rule or
statute mandating the contents of the PPI.122 Therefore, the information
will differ significantly depending on the inmate and the probation officer
preparing the report.123 Additionally, the probation officer writes many
narrative sections for the PPI, such as the summary of the facts of the crime
and a summary of the inmate’s social history.124 Due to the subjective
114. Gelb & Compa, supra note 27.
115. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2019).
116. Id.
117. See id. § 15:574.12(A)–(B); see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, §
701(C) (2019); LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 71.
118. Letter from James E. Boren to Mallory C. Waller and Judge Guy
Holdridge, supra note 84.
119. See id.
120. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.12(A)–(B).
121. Letter from James E. Boren to Mallory C. Waller and Judge Guy
Holdridge, supra note 84.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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nature of the narratives, many of them may be inaccurate.125 For example,
the summaries of facts in the PPI have occasionally contradicted the facts
that the prosecution used to establish the inmate’s guilt at trial.126 This
occurs, in part, because there is no guidance provided to a probation officer
on what documents to use to create the PPI, so occasionally the officer will
use documents, such as police reports, that misstate facts or contain details
that were never litigated at trial or that were proven false at trial.127
Prohibiting an inmate from access to the PPI prejudices an inmate because
he is not provided any opportunity to refute the information contained in
the PPI, and therefore the Committee is potentially considering false or
misstated information when making its parole decisions.128
For example, at a recent parole hearing, the Committee, in reliance on
the PPI, asked an inmate about crimes he committed before his current
conviction.129 The PPI contained information about prior thefts, but the
inmate shared a time he assaulted someone.130 The Committee then
confronted the inmate about the thefts, and he had to explain, during the
parole hearing, that he was never convicted for theft, only for assault.131 It
is not clear why the PPI contained misinformation.132 The inmate’s
counsel assumed that the probation officer was looking at the wrong
inmate’s file when drafting the PPI.133
In the case of Henry Montgomery, the PPI’s factual summary
indicated that Mr. Montgomery shot a police officer while the officer was
retreating with his arms up.134 This factual allegation was a statement the
police officer’s partner made in the initial police report but later rescinded
during trial, where the partner confessed that he was actually about 350
yards away and could not see the victim nor Mr. Montgomery at the time
of the shooting.135 Mr. Montgomery tried to explain to the Committee that
the officer did not have his hands up at the time of the shooting, but rather
the officer was in plain clothes, and Mr. Montgomery thought he was
reaching for a gun and became afraid.136 The Committee replied that they
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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had to use the “documented facts in the case,” otherwise known as the PPI,
which included the initial false statement from the police report.137
The Committee wants inmates to show remorse for the crimes they
committed in the past and to show respect to authority.138 But this is
difficult to accomplish when the statute prohibits inmates and their
attorneys from accessing the PPI, and the information the Committee
confronts them with during the hearing is incorrect.139 An inmate will
potentially come across as unremorseful, disrespectful, or even untruthful,
limiting his or her chances for release.140
B. Why Let the Committee Do a Job the Risk Assessment Tools Can Do
More Accurately?
The Administrative Code recommends that the Committee consider
eight factors as guidelines, not the exclusive criteria on which to base its
decision.141 As for the eighth factor, risk assessment, Louisiana currently
has two risk assessment tools that the Committee can use: Louisiana
Risk/Needs Assessment (LARNA) and Targeted Interventions Gaining
Enhanced Re-Entry (TIGER).142 Both tools employ a formula that predicts
an inmate’s risk level—his risk of recidivism within a three-year period—
which the Committee will then consider along with the other factors when
deciding whether to grant or deny parole.143
When calculating risk, the risk assessment tools evaluate their own set
of factors, including the ones listed in the Administrative Code.144 These

137. See id. (emphasis added).
138. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C) (2019). The eight factors are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the crime; (2) prior criminal record; (3)
character, social background, and emotional and physical condition; (4)
institutional adjustment; (5) police, judicial, and community attitudes toward the
offender; (6) parole plan; (7) program participation; and (8) risk assessment. Id. §
701(C)(1)–(8).
142. ALEXIS LEE WATTS ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. LAW & CRIM. JUST.,
PROFILES IN PAROLE RELEASE AND REVOCATION: EXAMINING THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES: LOUISIANA (2018), https://robinainsti
tute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/files/louisiana_parole_profile_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TM54-J3HN].
143. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(8) (2019).
144. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
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factors can be classified as either dynamic or static.145 Dynamic factors are
factors that are susceptible to change and show signs of an inmate’s
rehabilitation or lack thereof.146 The dynamic factors that the
Administrative Code suggests the Committee consider are (1) character,
social background, and emotional and physical condition; (2) institutional
adjustment; (3) the inmate’s parole plan; and (4) his or her program
participation.147 The other two factors, the nature and circumstances of the
crime and prior criminal record, are static factors.148 Static factors, as they
relate to parole, are features of the offender’s history that predict
recidivism, but are not susceptible to intervention or rehabilitation and,
therefore, do not signify whether someone has been rehabilitated.149
The two risk assessment tools use an algorithm that weighs all of the
factors and predicts an inmate’s risk level, which will either score as low,
moderate, or high.150 LARNA is the older of the two risk assessment tools,
and thus it is more widely used because the entire state has been trained to
use it.151 TIGER is a newer risk and needs assessment tool that improves
upon LARNA.152 TIGER has two components: the risk component and the
needs component.153 TIGER’s risk component is accurate approximately
90% of the time, compared to LARNA’s approximate 60% accuracy.154
The risk component of TIGER evaluates a variety of factors, each given a
different weight using a statistically validated algorithm.155 There are
separate algorithms for men serving longer sentences, as well as those
serving time for sex offenses to ensure the highest possibility of accuracy
for the specific inmate.156 Yet, the Administrative Code allows the

145. See generally R. Karl Hanson, Giving Meaning to Risk Factors, 15(6)
RES. SUMMARY 1 (2010), available at https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/
pblctns/mnng-fctrs/mnng-fctrs-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AT6-DRXF].
146. Id.
147. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(3)–(4), (6)–(7)
(2019).
148. See generally Hanson, supra note 145.
149. See generally id.
150. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
151. See generally LOUISIANA JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2017), https://www.lasc.org/documents/LA_Task_
Force_Report_2017_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP34-2MWU].
152. See id.
153. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
154. Id. Keith was the Project Manager of the team that created TIGER, which
was a partnership between the DOC and LSU’s School of Sociology.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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Committee members to give their own weight to each of the factors,
despite having an extremely accurate and objective risk assessment tool.157
Allowing the Committee to give their own weight to these factors
shifts the focus of the hearing from the purpose of parole, which is to look
at whether the inmate is currently able and willing to fulfill the obligations
of a law-abiding citizen, and permits the Committee to focus on the past
crime and to deny parole based on a static factor—one that will never
change.158 The Committee’s consideration of static factors during the
parole hearing puts the inmate in the position of being on trial for a crime
he has already been convicted of, focusing on past acts, not on the present
state of the inmate.159 It also provides the Committee with a method to
invoke their own implicit biases during parole hearings.160 Parole
decisions are highly discretionary, and each member of the Committee has
different opinions about the nature and circumstances of the crime or the
prior criminal record and how risky these factors are in relation to
recidivism.161 By allowing the Committee to weigh these factors on their
own, an inmate’s parole decision depends on who is on the panel that day
and what their individual beliefs are about the static factors, as opposed to
relying on one of the objective risk assessment tools that the DOC
developed to predict risk.162
C. Law Enforcement and Victim Impact Statements—Good in Theory,
Bad in Practice
Law enforcement and victims play an important and valuable role in
criminal justice proceedings both leading up to and throughout
sentencing.163 Allowing victim and law enforcement opposition
statements at parole hearings, however, is unfair and prejudices the inmate
in a number of ways.164 First, the victim and law enforcement are allowed
to testify before the Committee in person, whereas the inmate is generally
required to attend and testify via video conference.165 Second, victims and
157. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(1)–(8) (2019).
158. See generally id. § 701(C)(1)–(2).
159. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
160. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(1)–(2). See also
Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
161. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(1)–(2). See also
Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
162. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
163. See discussion infra Part III.C.1–2.
164. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 102(A)(6)(a); id. § 510.
165. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 71.
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law enforcement have an opportunity to provide embellished or false
information, as there is no requirement that the speakers prove the
accuracy of their statements, and there is no procedural mechanism for the
inmate or counsel to challenge the statements’ accuracy.166 Third, the
Administrative Code advises the Committee to give the greatest weight to
police, judicial, and community attitudes toward the offender, but their
“attitudes” speak to who the inmate was before he entered prison, not his
rehabilitation or current state.167 Ultimately, the Administrative Code’s
allowance of victim and law enforcement testimony at parole hearings
once again shifts the focus from the inmate’s rehabilitation and “[ability
and willingness] to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen” to a resentencing of the crime the inmate has already been convicted of and
sentenced for.168 Additionally, “the decision to release an individual
should be informed exclusively by an understanding of that [individual],”
and because law enforcement and victims often have not had any
interaction with the inmate since sentencing, they simply do not possess
the information related to the inmate’s current ability or willingness to
fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen—at which Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 15:574.4.1(B) says the Committee should be looking.169
1. Reducing Costs at the Expense of Fairness: Face-to-Face versus
Video Conference
Currently in Louisiana, most parole hearings happen via video
conference.170 This is likely because the Committee is able to conduct
hearings with multiple institutions on any given day by quickly switching
the video feed from one prison to the next, as opposed to traveling from
prison to prison.171 Additionally, many prisons in the state do not have a
space to hold parole hearings, and it would be a significant burden on
prison administration and staff to support public hearings at the
institution.172 Further, the DOC support staff and records are all at the
166. See generally LA. CODE EVID. arts. 101, 1101 (2019).
167. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(4)(a).
168. See Renaud, supra note 40; LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2019).
169. See Jorge Renaud, Should Prosecutors and Survivors Have a Voice in
Shortening Long Sentences?, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Oct. 25, 2018), https:
//www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/10/25/prosecutors-and-survivors/ [https://per
ma.cc/2L8Y-AW4A].
170. See LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 71.
171. See Interview with Robert Lancaster, supra note 89.
172. See id. Some of the additional burdens include additional processing of
visitors, extra security, and coordination of movement within prison. See id.
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DOC headquarters, and to transport all of the staff and the records to each
prison would be costly and inconvenient.173 Thus, an inmate attends the
hearing via video conference from the prison.174 Nonetheless, law
enforcement agents and the victim are able to meet face-to-face with the
Committee at the DOC headquarters.175 Though it may be faster and
cheaper to conduct hearings via video conference, it unfairly
disadvantages inmates.176
Some immigration detention hearings, like most parole hearings,
occur via video conference.177 Judge Amenia Khan, the executive vice
president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, noted the
growing use of video conferencing in immigration detention hearings and
said that video conferencing “does not always paint a complete picture” of
a detained immigrant.178 The judge noted that interaction is difficult during
video conferencing, and it is hard to judge eye contact and nonverbal cues
like body language.179
Though Judge Kahn was referring to immigrants in detention,
Louisiana’s inmates face the same barriers in parole hearings.180 Henry
Montgomery faced these barriers when he struggled to connect with the
Committee during both of his parole hearings.181 His attorney, Keith
Nordyke, had to repeat many of the questions the Committee asked Mr.
Montgomery because Mr. Montgomery struggled to comprehend the
questions due to the video feed and his already disabled hearing.182
Everyone who knows Mr. Montgomery, from fellow prisoners to those
assisting him in his long-fought attempt at receiving parole, know him as
a quiet, humble man.183 He was nervous and struggled with expressing
himself during the hearing.184 The Committee, however, did not see that

173. See id.
174. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 71.
175. Id.
176. See Renaud, supra note 40.
177. See id.
178. See Christina Goldbaum, Videoconferencing in Immigration Court:
High-Tech Solution or Rights Violation?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/12/nyregion/immigration-court-video-teleconferenc
ing.html [https://perma.cc/436D-BDY5].
179. See id.
180. See Segura, supra note 4.
181. See Reckdahl, supra note 3.
182. See id.; Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
183. See Reckdahl, supra note 3.
184. See id.
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side of Henry Montgomery due to the barrier the video feed creates
between an inmate and the Committee.185
The difference between a video conference versus a face-to-face
meeting with the Committee serves as a substantial disadvantage to the
offender.186 There are often technical issues and sound delays, making it
hard for the inmate to hear the Committee’s questions and for the
Committee to hear the inmate’s response.187 Generally, the video feed
further paints the picture that the inmate is and should remain removed
from society due to the lack of personal connection and the idea that the
inmate needs to be kept “away.”188 Thus, much like immigrants who are
more likely to be deported when judges conduct their hearings via video
conference, inmates are in an unfavorable position due to the barriers the
video feed creates.189 This disadvantage is further exacerbated by the
Administrative Code’s policy of allowing law enforcement and victims to
speak face-to-face with the Committee at parole hearings.190 The
Committee is able to hear every word victims and law enforcement say,
along with the inflection in their voice, see their tears, and connect with
them in ways they cannot with inmates due to the barriers that the video
feed imposes.191 This lack of face-to-face interaction, however, is not the
only issue that inmates face during parole hearings.192
2. Effects of the Lack of Evidentiary Rules during Parole Hearings
The lack of traditional evidentiary rules during parole hearings means
that the testimony from victims and law enforcement can be legally
irrelevant or even inaccurate.193 Additionally, parole hearings are
inquisitorial in nature, as opposed to the typical adversarial nature of
traditional criminal proceedings.194 The inquisitorial nature of the parole
185. See id.
186. See Renaud, supra note 40.
187. Interview with Ashleigh Dowden, Administrative Assistant at the Parole
Project, Baton Rouge, La. (Oct. 9, 2019); Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra
note 104. This is anecdotal evidence that was received from Ashleigh Dowden,
Administrative Assistant at the Parole Project, as well as Keith Nordyke.
188. See Interview with Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 187.
189. Renaud, supra note 40.
190. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 102(A)(6)(a) (2019); id. § 510(A).
191. See id. § 102(A)(6)(a); id. § 510(A); Renaud, supra note 40.
192. See discussion infra Part II.C.2–3.
193. See generally LA. CODE EVID. arts. 101, 1101 (2019).
194. See R. Kyle Alagood, Parole Release Hearings: The Fallacy of
Discretion, 5 T. MARSHALL L. J. GENDER, RACE, JUST. 1 (2015).
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hearing inhibits an inmate’s ability to respond to or rebut inaccurate or
irrelevant information that another party presents during the hearing.195 As
a result, the Committee is at a risk of considering inaccurate or irrelevant
information when deciding whether to grant or deny parole.196
The Administrative Code allows victims to testify at the parole
hearings on their views of the offense, but occasionally the facts the
victims state during parole hearings are not included in any reports of the
crime, nor the trial record.197 In the case of a deceased victim, the
Administrative Code allows the spouse or next of kin of the deceased
victim to speak to the Committee.198 For inmates who are serving long
sentences, this could mean that the grandchildren of the victim, who were
not alive when the victim died, may testify during the hearing.199 Keith
Nordyke refers to this sort of testimony as “family hearsay” because it is
often stories detailing the crime that have developed over the years to keep
the victim’s memory alive but are “simply not true.”200 Yet, according to
the Administrative Code, the Committee is supposed to give “[p]olice,
[j]udicial, and [c]ommunity [a]ttitudes toward the [o]ffender” the greatest
amount of weight, compared to the other factors, when considering
whether to grant or deny parole.201 Thus, the Committee is giving the most
weight to potentially false or embellished testimony.202
a. Effects of Miller v. Alabama on Victim and Law Enforcement
Testimony
In 2017, a new issue in parole hearings arose when the state legislature
passed Act 277, which provided parole eligibility to prisoners who were
serving life sentences without parole for crimes they committed as
juveniles, including those convicted of murder.203 This legislation was a
response to Montgomery v. Louisiana, where the U.S. Supreme Court held

195. See id.
196. Id.
197. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 510(A) (2019); see also Interview
with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104; Interview with Kerry Myers and Ashleigh
Dowden, supra note 104.
198. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 510(B)(3).
199. See id.
200. See Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
201. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(5).
202. See id.
203. Act No. 277, 2017 La. Acts 681 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §
15:574.4(D)(1) (2019)).
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that its Miller v. Alabama204 holding applied retroactively.205 The Court, in
Miller, concluded that juvenile life without the opportunity of parole was
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment if the court
sentenced the inmate under a mandatory sentencing scheme that did not
allow for an individualized determination.206 The Court reasoned that
juveniles possess “diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change.”207 Thus, it was unconstitutional to mandatorily sentence juveniles
to life without the opportunity of parole, and the states must deem them
parole eligible.208 As a result, the DOC is now informing family members
of deceased victims, who thought the offender would be serving life
without the opportunity for parole, that the offender is eligible for
parole.209 Family members of victims are in turn encouraged to testify at
the parole hearing.210
This specific type of victim testimony is different from others, first,
because the victim is deceased and, second, because these inmates were
serving sentences of life without parole, and now they have parole
eligibility.211 Therefore, the common argument is “why should this person
get a second chance when [my victim] did not,” or “the prosecutor told me
[the inmate] would never be able to get out.”212 The Administrative Code
then suggests that the Committee give this sort of testimony “greater
weight” during its consideration.213 This testimony, however, is not
relevant to a parole hearing because, as a result of Act 277, these offenders
are eligible for a “second chance.”214
At Henry Montgomery’s first parole hearing, the daughter of the
victim testified and asked the Committee “to give [Mr. Montgomery] the
same consideration he gave [her] father and [her] family,” further stating
that Mr. Montgomery “needs to stay [in prison].”215 She also testified that
her father’s death is not reversible, insinuating that Mr. Montgomery’s life

204. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
205. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
206. 567 U.S. at 489.
207. Id. at 479.
208. Montgomery, 577 U.S. 190.
209. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 510 (2019).
210. See id.
211. See Interview with Kerry Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104.
212. Id.
213. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(5) (2019).
214. Act No. 277, 2017 La. Acts 681 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §
15:574.4(D)(1) (2019)) (emphasis added).
215. Toohey, supra note 6.
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sentence should not be either.216 Although it is true her father’s death is
not reversible, her statement and its insinuation contradict the principle
that juvenile lifers have a higher capacity for change, and take the focus
away from the facts supporting that Mr. Montgomery is no longer a threat
to society and should not remain in prison.217
Law enforcement’s arguments tend to look similarly to the victim’s
family’s arguments.218 Officers often testify that they promised the
victim’s family that the offender would never be released from prison.219
As a result, the Committee may feel the need to uphold that promise, as it
would uphold the integrity of law enforcement and the judicial system as
a whole.220 It may be true that the agent made that promise; however, the
issue still remains—these sorts of inmates show a “heightened capacity for
change” and, as a result, are eligible for parole.221 These types of
arguments that law enforcement and the victim or the victim’s family
make have no place in parole hearings, as they distract the Committee from
the purpose of the hearing: to determine whether the prisoner is able and
willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.222
Further, when the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 277, which
provided the opportunity for parole to juvenile lifers, it also enacted
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 878.1.223 This article was a
temporary mechanism that allowed prosecutors to maintain the juvenilelife-without-the-opportunity-for-parole sentence, but they had to file a
notice to the trial court by December 1, 2017.224 The trial court would then
conduct a hearing to determine parole eligibility.225 This was a
legislatively created mechanism for prosecutors to oppose parole
eligibility based on factors like the nature and circumstances of the crime
and prior criminal history.226 If the prosecutor did not file the notice by the
due date, the sentence would automatically revert to life with the
216. Id.
217. See Interview with Kerry Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104; Interview with Kerry
Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104.
221. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); see also Act No. 277, 2017
La. Acts 681 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(D)(1) (2019)).
222. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2019).
223. Act No. 277, 2017 La. Acts 681 (codified at LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
878.1 (2019)).
224. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 878.1 (2019).
225. Id.
226. See id.
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opportunity for parole.227 Many prosecutors did not file the notice;
therefore, numerous juvenile lifers were automatically parole eligible.228
These prosecutors essentially waived their ability to argue that the inmate
should not be released based on the static factors when they failed to file
the notice by December 1, 2017, yet the Administrative Code still allows
them to attend parole hearings and oppose release using arguments that
rely on factors like the nature and circumstances of the crime and prior
criminal history.229 Arguments based on those static factors were exactly
the point of the legislature passing article 878.1, yet now these prosecutors
are attending parole hearings and making such arguments.230 To allow
them to make these arguments now is unfair to the inmates whom, as a
result of the prosecutor’s failure to file the notice, the system automatically
deemed parole eligible.231 These arguments again shift the focus of the
hearing from whether the inmate is able and willing to fulfill the
obligations of a law-abiding citizen to whether the Committee should hear
the case in the first place, which is not the purpose of a parole hearing.232
3. Tipping the Scale: The Weight Given to Victim and Law
Enforcement Opposition
From lawyers to re-entry assistants, the people who represent and
assist inmates in parole hearings know that if an inmate has law
enforcement or victim opposition at the parole hearing, his or her chances
at release reduce dramatically.233 The Committee will often tell an inmate
during a hearing why they are denying parole, and if not, it is in the parole
decision form, a copy of which the inmate receives after the hearing.234
Many in the parole community believe that the Committee will often cite
another reason for why they are denying parole, such as a lack of
programming, when the true reason is actually law enforcement or victim

227. Id.
228. See Interview with Robert Lancaster, supra note 89.
229. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 102(A)(6)(a) (2019).
230. See Interview with Robert Lancaster, supra note 89.
231. See generally LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 878.1 (providing a mechanism
for prosecutors to maintain a juvenile life without parole sentence by filing a
notice with the trial court by December 1, 2017).
232. See LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2019).
233. See Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104; Interview with Kerry
Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104.
234. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 703; see also Segura, supra note 4.
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opposition.235 In both of Henry Montgomery’s parole hearings, the
Committee stated that they were denying release due to his failure to
“participate[] in enough programs,” though they never told Mr.
Montgomery what programming he should complete that would be
sufficient.236 The Administrative Code does not require the Committee to
tell an inmate what programming would be sufficient; however, it is not
uncommon for an inmate to be told they need to finish certain programs
they have already started before they can be released.237 After Mr.
Montgomery’s last hearing, Keith Nordyke, Mr. Montgomery’s attorney,
asked the warden at the Louisiana State Penitentiary what other programs
Mr. Montgomery could take.238 The warden responded that “there may be
some substance abuse class he hasn’t taken.”239 The irony in the warden’s
suggestion, however, is that Henry Montgomery does not and has never
had a substance abuse problem.240
At Mr. Montgomery’s parole hearing, the Baton Rouge Police
Department, the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, and the
statewide associations for sheriff’s offices and police departments all
accompanied the victim’s family to oppose Mr. Montgomery’s release.241
Though the Committee cited a “lack of programming” as the reason they
denied release for Mr. Montgomery, the parole community believed this
denial was one of those times that the Committee used programming as a
guise for the true reason for denial: law enforcement and victim
opposition.242
The Committee reported that in the first half of 2016, over 60% of
their denials were attributed to law enforcement opposition or to victim
opposition which only includes the times the Committee was willing to
admit that law enforcement or victim opposition was the reason for

235. See Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104; see also Interview
with Kerry Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104.
236. Segura, supra note 4.
237. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 703 (2019). This
regulation speaks to the result of a decision to grant or deny parole but does not
include any requirement to inform an inmate on what the inmate must do in order
for the Committee to grant parole.
238. Segura, supra note 4.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Toohey, supra note 6.
242. Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104; Interview with Kerry
Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra, note 104.
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denying parole.243 The Administrative Code allowing victims and law
enforcement to testify is enabling the Committee to abuse the broad
discretion it already grants them.244 The Committee is able to shift from
evidence-based practices, focused on determining whether an inmate is
able and willing to fulfill his obligations as a law-abiding citizen, to
essentially re-trying the inmate for a crime he was already convicted of,
except this time the rules of evidence do not apply, which is prejudicial to
the inmate and makes it more likely the inmate will remain incarcerated.
Under current Louisiana law, an inmate may be eligible for parole and
truly pose no threat to society, yet the Committee may still deny release.245
The laws governing parole hearings already provide the Committee with
an extraordinary amount of discretion, and the procedural aspects of
hearings encourage and allow abuse of that discretion by (1) suggesting
that the Committee members make a parole determination by both
weighing the static factors on their own and using the risk assessment tool,
which has already weighed the static factors and given them a statistically
validated weight; (2) prohibiting access to the PPI; and (3) conducting
hearings via video conference, while nonetheless allowing face-to-face
victim and law enforcement opposition.246 These laws contradict one of
the main goals of the comprehensive reform package passed in 2017—
prioritizing prison space on those who pose a serious threat to public
safety—and instead keep Louisiana’s low-risk prisoners incarcerated.247
III. A GAME OF GIVE AND TAKE: PROPOSED PAROLE HEARING REFORM
The effects of Louisiana’s 2017 reform parallel a theme seen
nationally as a result of criminal justice reform over the last decade—
“[s]tates’ policy choices can help control the size and cost of their prison
systems and protect public safety.”248 As of December 2019, the
imprisonment rate in Louisiana was down to an estimated 683 per 100,000
residents, compared to the 882 per 100,000 residents at its peak in 2012.249
The current laws on parole hearings, however, still allow for the
243. Julia O’Donoghue, For Louisiana Prisoners, Parole Is Still an Uphill
Climb, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.nola.com/news/politics/
article_4947ab0b-68bb-5a17-8956-dfbc0624a5af.html [https://perma.cc/4H3APFES].
244. See generally Renaud, supra note 40.
245. See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
246. Id.
247. See Gelb & Compa, supra note 27.
248. Id.
249. See Skene, supra note 26.
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Committee to deny parole to prisoners who no longer pose a serious threat
to public safety.250 Therefore, to truly “decarcerate” Louisiana and
prioritize prison space on those who pose a serious threat, the legislature
must amend the Louisiana Revised Statutes and Administrative Code
articles governing parole hearings.
A. Pre-Parole Investigation
Prohibiting an inmate and his attorney from accessing the PPI results
in confusion, delays, and poses potential constitutional issues for juvenile
lifers.251 Currently, there is no mechanism for inmates or their attorneys to
contest the “facts” that are stated in the PPI, though it is clear the “facts”
are often incorrect or misstated.252 This creates a “barrier to meaningful
communication” between the Committee and the inmate.253 The result is
time spent attempting to clarify facts in the PPI, causing a delay in the
parole hearing, even though the Committee must ultimately consider the
factual summary provided in the PPI as the official version of the events.254
In a letter sent to the Louisiana State Law Institute, those interested in
a change in the law also raised a potential constitutional concern with the
prohibition of access to the PPI from inmates seeking parole.255 This
applies to juvenile lifers, specifically, who now have the opportunity for
parole after the recent Supreme Court decisions in Graham v. Florida,
Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, which required juvenile
offenders to have a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”256
Louisiana, like most states, has opted to grant juvenile lifers the
opportunity for parole in order to meet the mandate.257 A federal district
court in Missouri recently held that where a state has chosen the parole
process as a means to satisfy this constitutional requirement, additional

250. See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
251. See Letter from James Boren to Mallory Waller and Judge Guy
Holdridge, supra note 84.
252. See discussion supra Part II.A.
253. Letter from James Boren to Mallory Waller and Judge Guy Holdridge,
supra note 84.
254. See discussion supra Part II.A.
255. See Letter from James Boren to Mallory Waller and Judge Guy
Holdridge, supra note 84.
256. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 479 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
257. See Act No. 277, 2017 La. Acts 681 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §
15:574.4(D)(1) (2019)).
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protections apply.258 The court found that Missouri’s parole processes,
specifically prohibiting inmates from accessing their parole files, which
include “the prehearing report that largely guides the format and content
of the . . . hearings,” violated Graham, Miller, and Montgomery’s
requirement that the state provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release.”259 The court further provided that the because the state is keeping
the information in these files from inmates, the “inmates cannot know of,
let alone challenge, ‘allegations of fact they perceive to be false.’”260
Louisiana, like Missouri, must ensure that parole hearings afford juvenile
lifers procedural protections that allow for a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release from prison or else remain in violation of the
Constitution.261
Though the constitutional argument is only in reference to juvenile
lifers, prohibiting any applicant from accessing the PPI causes
unnecessary delay and confusion.262 If the state were to allow applicants
and their attorneys the right to access the PPI, they could address and
clarify any mistakes or misapprehension of the facts before the parole
hearing or at the start of it.263 This would ensure constitutional compliance
in reference to juvenile lifers and guarantee accuracy and fairness for all
other applicants.264 Therefore, the Louisiana Legislature should amend
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.12(B) to include applicants and their
attorneys to the list of parties that may access the PPI upon request. The
statute should read as follows, with the addition in italics:
Information may be released upon request without special
authorization, subject to other restrictions that may be imposed by
federal law or by other provisions of state law, to the committee
258. See Brown v. Precythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL, 2018 WL 4956519, at
*10 (W.D. Mo., Oct. 12, 2018). The four plaintiffs in the case were all serving
mandatory life without parole sentences for homicide offenses committed when
they were fewer than 18 years old. They challenged the Missouri Department of
Corrections policies and procedures for juvenile life without parole hearings. The
court concluded that the defendants’ policies and procedures did violate the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and that, among
other things, the inmate is entitled to the prehearing report. See id. at 10.
259. Id. at *6–7 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).
260. Id. at *8.
261. See Letter from James Boren to Mallory Waller and Judge Guy
Holdridge, supra note 84.
262. See discussion supra Part II.A.
263. See Letter from James Boren to Mallory Waller and Judge Guy
Holdridge, supra note 84.
264. Id.

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 489

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1598

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

on parole, the Board of Pardons, the governor, the sentencing
judge, counsel for the juvenile in a delinquency matter, a district
attorney or law enforcement agency, the personnel and legal
representatives of the Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, the parole applicant and his/her attorney, corrections
services and youth services, including student interns, appropriate
governmental agencies, or officials when access to such
information is imperative for discharge of the responsibilities of
the requesting agency, official, or court officer and the
information is not reasonably available through any other means,
and court officers with court orders specifying the information
requested.265
B. Risk Assessment Tools and Static Factors
In order for the Administrative Code’s parole procedures to align with
the purpose of parole, the legislature must remove the Committee’s ability
to individually consider and weigh the static factors.266 The Committee
already has broad discretion when making parole decisions, and the
Administrative Code suggesting that the Committee consider factors such
as the nature and circumstance of the crime, as well as prior criminal
record, enables the Committee to abuse that broad discretion.267 These
factors are highly subjective, and the weight given to them varies
dramatically depending on the person.268 The Committee’s vision
265. The current version of the Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:574.12(B)
reads as follows:
Information may be released upon request without special authorization,
subject to other restrictions that may be imposed by federal law or by
other provisions of state law, to the committee on parole, the Board of
Pardons, the governor, the sentencing judge, counsel for the juvenile in
a delinquency matter, a district attorney or law enforcement agency, the
personnel and legal representatives of the Department of Public Safety
and Corrections, corrections services and youth services, including
student interns, appropriate governmental agencies, or officials when
access to such information is imperative for discharge of the
responsibilities of the requesting agency, official, or court officer and the
information is not reasonably available through any other means, and
court officers with court orders specifying the information requested.
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.12(B) (2019).
266. See generally id. § 15:574.4.1(B). See also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt.
11, § 701(C)(1)–(2) (2019).
267. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 701(C)(8); Renaud, supra note 40.
268. See Renaud, supra note 40.
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statement requires the use of evidence-based practices to guide
decisions.269 The best way to do that is to use TIGER, the most accurate
risk assessment tool and the most objective evidence-based data available
to the Committee.270
Louisiana continues to use LARNA because not all areas have been
trained to use TIGER.271 However, the DOC should make it a priority to
have all areas trained in order to further its vision of making decisions
using evidence-based practices. Using TIGER, and not the Committee’s
own individual discretion, to consider the nature and circumstances of the
crime and the inmate’s prior criminal history would give these static
factors the scientifically proven weight they deserve and, in turn, make the
process more fair for the inmates. Further, this would remove some
discretion from the Committee, and refocus the parole hearing on the
inmate’s current willingness and ability to fulfill the obligations of a lawabiding citizen.272 Therefore, since the TIGER algorithm already
accomplishes the task of considering these static factors, the legislature
should amend Administrative Code article 701(C) and remove the nature
and circumstances of the crime and prior criminal record from the list of
suggested factors for the Committee to consider.
Removing the static factors from the Committee’s consideration
would allow the risk assessment tool to inform the Committee’s initial
release decision based on the inmate’s risk level, and then the Committee
may modify that decision using the dynamic factors such as (1) character,
social background, and emotional and physical condition; (2) institutional
adjustment; (3) parole plan; and (4) program participation.273 To ensure
the Committee is using these dynamic factors appropriately, if they deny
parole, the Administrative Code must require the Committee to inform the
applicant of exactly what he must do to satisfy the Committee’s
expectations. This can be done via the parole decision form the Committee
is required to complete and provide to the inmate.274 For example, if the
Committee denies for a “lack of programming,” the Administrative Code
269. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, BOARD POLICY 01-101 (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/01-101-Vision-and-Mission
-of-the-Board.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6CF-TPB7].
270. See Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
271. See id.
272. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2019) (providing that
parole should be granted “upon determination by the committee that there is a
reasonable probability that the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations
of a law-abiding citizen . . . .”).
273. See Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
274. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 703 (2019).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 491

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1600

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

should require that the Committee tell the applicant exactly what sort of
programming they expect the applicant to complete. This will ensure that
the Committee does not abuse their discretion and, instead, that they deny
parole for justifiable reasons, not because of implicit biases relating to the
static factors.275
Ultimately, there are four parts to this process. First, the DOC must
ensure that the prisons within the state are trained to use TIGER. Second,
the legislature must remove the static factors from the Committee’s
individual consideration in Administrative Code article 701(C), only
allowing the static factors to be evaluated in the TIGER algorithm. Third,
the Administrative Code should make the Committee’s initial determinant
of release based on an inmate’s TIGER risk score and then allow the
Committee to modify that decision using the dynamic factors. Finally, the
Administrative Code must require that the Committee inform the inmate
of what he must do in order to obtain release if the inmate was denied for
a reason related to one of the dynamic factors. This will remove some of
the discretion given to the Committee and ensure consistency and fairness
for inmates.
C. Law Enforcement and Victim Opposition: Changing, Not Removing
Their Voices
Currently, the Administrative Code suggests that the Committee give
the greatest weight to “[p]olice, [j]udicial and [c]ommunity [a]ttitudes
toward the [o]ffender.”276 The Administrative Code states that this factor
is given the greatest weight because the likelihood that an inmate will be
successful on parole diminishes if the community he returns to has
expressed hostility or a lack of support for him.277 An inmate, however,
does not have to return to the community where the crime occurred.278 The
Committee may set conditions on release and order the inmate to live in a
parish that does not express hostility or a lack of support toward him or

275.
276.
277.
278.
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her.279 Thus, victims and law enforcement testimony should not carry as
much weight as they currently do in parole hearings.280
1. Victims or Victims’ Families: Conditions, Not Decisions
Victims play an important role in criminal justice proceedings.281 For
example, victims can benefit from the experience of giving impact
evidence at sentencing, and judges perceive this participation as beneficial
to the process.282 The victim’s input at a parole hearing, however, serves a
different purpose.283 A victim’s level of knowledge about information
relevant to the parole decision is often lacking.284 At the parole hearing,
the Committee should focus on a determination of whether the inmate is
able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.285 Thus,
a victim’s in-person testimony should not taint the Committee’s decision,
and the decision should be based solely on the evidence-based practices
the Committee learned about in their onboarding and annual training.286 It
is only the Committee who has the resources to understand an inmate’s
current behavior and needs.287
The goal is not to silence victims but, rather, shift the manner the
Committee considers victim testimony.288 Currently, the victim or his or
her family are allowed to present oral or written testimony of their views
about the offense, the offender, and the effect of the offense on the
victim.289 The rules of evidence, however, do not govern this sort of
279. See id. Andrew Hundley, the executive director of the Louisiana Parole
Project, was released on parole in 2016. One of the conditions of his parole was
that he would be barred from entering Acadia Parish, the parish where the victim’s
family resides. Grace Toohey, The ‘Power of Second Chances’: How This 37Year-Old, Once in Prison, Is Now an LSU Grad, THE ADVOCATE (May 10, 2019),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_03c590ae
-72a9-11e9-8d2b-4b78d19fcd5b.html [https://perma.cc/YF25-AFM6].
280. See Renaud, supra note 40.
281. See id.
282. Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input
at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUSTICE 347, 353–54 (2009).
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4.1(B) (2019).
286. See generally LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 103(D) (2019). See also
id. § 117.
287. See Renaud, supra note 40.
288. See Interview with Kerry Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104;
see also Interview with Keith Nordyke, supra note 104.
289. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 510.
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testimony; thus, it is often prejudicial to the inmate and does not further
the purpose of parole hearings.290 Instead, the Code should provide that a
victim or victim’s family may express his concern and desired conditions
for parole via written request only, and that request should not include an
ultimate opinion about release or non-release.291 For example, if a victim
is scared of an inmate and does not want to risk seeing him in public, he
can request a condition of parole that instructs the inmate to live in another
parish.292
Additionally, victims are in a unique position to promote
programming in prison that focuses on transformation.293 A 2016 national
survey highlights this unique position, as it revealed that 60% of victims
prefer shorter prison sentences and a focus on prevention and
rehabilitation, as opposed to longer prison sentences.294 As such, the DOC
could consult survivors’ rights groups when it is determining what sort of
programming prisons should offer to prepare inmates for eventual release,
giving victims a voice in the rehabilitation of inmates.295
In effect, victims should be heard during sentencing in their victim
impact statement, during the determination of what programming to put in
prisons, and prior to a parole hearing, in writing, to aid in determining what
conditions to set on a specific inmate upon release, but not in person during
parole hearings and not regarding the ultimate decision of release or nonrelease. As a result, the legislature should amend all legislation, starting
with Administrative Code article 510, that currently allows for victims to
testify at parole hearings and should only allow for written request as to
considerations upon release.
2. Prosecutors and Other Law Enforcement Agencies
Reliance on the participation of prosecutors and other law
enforcement agents is misplaced because they can only speak to the nature
290. See discussion supra Part II.C.2–3.
291. CATHERINE C. MCVEY ET AL., ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. LAW AND CRIM.
JUST., MODERNIZING PAROLE STATUTES: GUIDANCE FROM EVIDENCE-BASED
PRACTICE (2018), https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/sites/robinainstitute.umn.edu/
files/parole_ebp_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEP4-S3QZ].
292. See Toohey, supra note 279.
293. Renaud, supra note 40.
294. ALLIANCE FOR SAFETY AND JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE
FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SURVEY ON VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE,
https://allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/Crime%2
0Survivors%20Speak%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HMS-NPH7].
295. See Renaud, supra note 40.
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of the crime, not whether the inmate underwent a transformation while
incarcerated.296 Yet, the powers and duties of the Committee include a
requirement that they must allow the district attorney of the parish where
the conviction occurred to review the offender’s incarceration record when
the inmate is eligible for parole.297 Further, the Administrative Code
allows the district attorney to participate in the hearing, both by presenting
testimony, as well as submitting information he or she deems relevant to
the proceeding.298 Prosecutors, like victims, lack the level of knowledge
needed to testify as to whether the inmate is currently a public safety
threat.299 As a result, their input at parole hearings achieves little apart from
intimidating the Committee into denying release.300
Additionally, prosecutors play an important role in sentencing.301 In
reference to habitual offenders, plea agreements have a large impact on
parole eligibility.302 According to Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 15:574.4(A)(1)(b)(i), a person convicted of a third crime of violence or
sex offense shall not be eligible for parole.303 Prosecutors, however, in an
effort to secure convictions, often304 offer plea agreements to the
accused.305 Occasionally, that plea agreement will allow a person to plead
guilty to a lesser crime, sometimes a non-violent crime.306 Habitual nonviolent crimes, however, do not result in a loss of parole eligibility.307 In
some cases, the prosecutor will still attend the parole hearing and oppose
296. See id.
297. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. 11, § 102(A)(6)(a) (2019).
298. See id.
299. See Renaud, supra note 40.
300. R. Michael Cassidy, Undue Influence: A Prosecutor’s Role in Parole
Proceedings, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 293, 305 (2019).
301. Renaud, supra note 40.
302. See generally LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(1)(b)(i) (2019) (providing
that parole eligibility depends on a number of factors, including how many
convictions the person has and whether the convictions are classified as crimes of
violence or sex offenses).
303. See id.
304. A 2017 survey discovered that 97% of cases result in a plea agreement.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT (2018),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/
the-trial-penalty-the-sixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinctionand-how-to-save-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV46-GJAG].
305. See Renaud, supra note 40.
306. See Interview with Kerry Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104.
307. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(A)(1)(b)(i) (emphasis added). The statute only
refers to crimes of violence.
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the release of the offender, despite the fact that the prosecutor was the one
who allowed for parole eligibility by permitting the accused to plead guilty
to a non-violent crime, as opposed to the violent one they were initially
accused of.308
A prosecutor should not get a second chance to prolong an inmate’s
prison sentence, especially in the cases where the person is eligible
because of a plea agreement the prosecutor made.309 The prosecutor is not
honoring the deal made with the inmate and is usurping his rights pursuant
to the plea agreement.310 If a prosecutor believes a person is a threat to
society, he should focus his efforts on convicting them of the initial
crime—the one that would not allow for parole eligibility or would require
a longer sentence before eligibility—during the trial, as opposed to trying
to prevent release once the inmate is eligible for parole, when the focus is
supposed to be on whether there is a reasonable probability the inmate is
able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.311 There
is nothing else the prosecutor can offer at this point in the proceedings that
aligns with the purpose of parole hearings.312 As a result, the state
legislature should remove the requirements from the Administrative Code
that allow for opposition from district attorneys and other law enforcement
agencies at the parole hearing, starting with Administrative Code article
102(A)(6)(a).
3. Video Conference
Although the Committee is less likely to grant parole to an inmate
when the hearings are conducted via video conference,313 the Committee
is making an effort to conduct live hearings at the prisons every year.314 If
the legislature removed all of the other factors that allow the Committee
to abuse their discretion, then the fact that the hearing is conducted via
video conference would not be as detrimental to the inmate.315 This is
especially true if the victim opposition is converted to written request
focused on conditions upon release and if prosecutors are removed from
the parole hearing process as a whole. If the legislature continues to allow
308. See Interview with Kerry Myers and Ashleigh Dowden, supra note 104.
309. See Renaud, supra note 40.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
314. LA. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLE, supra note 48; see also discussion supra
Part II.C.1.
315. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
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this sort of testimony at parole hearings, however, it is necessary that the
inmate also meet face-to-face with the Committee.316 Thus, it is crucial the
legislature remove all other prejudicial procedures from the process
because conducting all parole hearings face-to-face with inmates would be
extremely costly, inconvenient, and difficult to accomplish.317
D. “Guess Who’s Back, Back Again”318
Although the 2017 criminal justice reform bills reduced the state’s
incarceration rate, and moved Louisiana from the first to the second
highest incarceration rate in the country for a short period of time, if the
legislature focused on decreasing such broad discretion from parole
hearings, more inmates would be granted parole, and the state’s
incarceration rate would decrease even more.319 This is especially
important now that Louisiana is back in first place after Oklahoma passed
its own criminal justice reform bills in 2019 and successfully decreased its
prison population.320 If the Louisiana Legislature truly believes in the
goals it emphasized in the 2017 comprehensive criminal justice reform
package, specifically, prioritizing prison space those who pose a serious
threat to public safety, then they should amend the laws governing parole
hearings to ensure that inmates who no longer pose a threat to society are
granted parole.321
CONCLUSION
With the national spotlight on Louisiana after the successful criminal
justice overhaul, now is the ideal time to reform parole.322 The country
lacks a state leader in parole, as the public and the law largely ignore this
area of criminal justice, especially compared to prison reform, which has

See id.
See id.
EMINEM, Without Me, on THE EMINEM SHOW (Interscope Records 2002).
See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
See Skene, supra note 26.
See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
See The Editorial Board, Louisiana’s Big Step on Justice Reform, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/opinion/louisianajustice-prison-reform.html [https://perma.cc/PB2T-8P2B]; see also Beth
Reinhard, Change and Culture Collide in America’s Prison Capital, WALL
STREET J. (May 25, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/change-and-culturecollide-in-americas-prison-capital-1495704602 [https://perma.cc/VHR4-L2VQ].
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
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been the focus of a broad national conversation.323 Prison reform,
however, is not enough.324 Louisiana must heed the call from academics
and organizations across the country and ensure fairness and consistency
in parole hearings.325
Governor John Bel Edwards and Department of Corrections Secretary
James LeBlanc, in a letter to the Louisiana Justice Reinvestment Task
Force in January of 2017, called for reforms that would “reduce the state
prison population significantly with the modest goal of not having the
highest incarceration rate in the country.”326 The Task Force delivered, and
Louisiana was, for a short period, no longer the highest incarcerated state
in the country, but Louisiana’s prisons still hold approximately 300 more
inmates per 100,000 residents compared to the national average and is,
once again, the country’s most incarcerated state.327 Further, as noted
above, Louisiana is not the only state that could use prison reform, as 36
other states received an extremely low grade when the Prison Policy
Initiative reviewed states’ policies.328 As seen by the Oklahoma legislation
that resulted from Louisiana’s 2017 reform, state policymaking matters
and can influence other states to follow.329 Thus, Louisiana currently has
the opportunity to lead the country in parole reform.
Many Louisiana inmates are parole eligible and, under an objective
analysis, show a reasonable probability that they are able and willing to
fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen, yet the Committee still

323. See Probation and Parole Systems Marked by High Stakes, Missed
Opportunities, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST (Sep. 25, 2018), https://www.pew
trusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2018/09/probation-and-parole-sy
stems-marked-by-high-stakes-missed-opportunities [https://perma.cc/ZV48-A7HR];
see also Renaud, supra note 40.
324. Piper Kerman, Statement on the Future of Community Corrections,
COLUMBIA JUST. LAB (Aug. 28, 2017), https://justicelab.columbia.edu/statementfuture-community-corrections [https://perma.cc/R5N9-RPLF].
325. See id.; see also MCVEY ET AL., supra note 291.
326. See Louisiana’s 2017 Criminal Justice Reforms: The Most Incarcerated
State Changes Course, supra note 106 (citing Letter from John Bel Edwards, Gov.
of La., and Jimmy LeBlanc, Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., to La. Justice Reinvestment
Task Force (Jan. 13, 2017)).
327. See Adam Gelb & Jacob Denney, National Prison Rate Continues to
Decline Amid Sentencing, Re-Entry Reforms, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST (Jan. 16,
2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2018/01/16/
national-prison-rate-continues-to-decline-amid-sentencing-re-entry-reforms
[https://perma.cc/B6Q4-8J8S]; see also Skene, supra note 26.
328. See Renaud, supra note 40.
329. See Skene, supra note 26.
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refuses to grant them parole.330 In the case of Henry Montgomery, a 74year-old man is being held in prison due to a lack of programming, but the
Committee refuses to grant him parole or simply tell him what
programming he needs to complete.331
The Louisiana Legislature should amend the current laws governing
parole hearings. This would remove some, but not all, of the discretion
from the Committee on Parole and ensure the use of evidence-based
practices.332 As a result, the Committee would grant release to prisoners
who no longer pose a public safety threat, thus decreasing the state’s prison
population, and ultimately furthering goal of the 2017 criminal justice
reform legislation—to prioritize prison space on those who pose a serious
threat to public safety.333

330. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
331. See Segura, supra note 4.
332. See discussion supra Part III.A–D.
333. See LA. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY AND CORR. & LA. COMM’N ON LAW
ENF’T., LOUISIANA’S JUSTICE REINVESTMENT REFORMS 2019 ANNUAL
PERFORMANCE REPORT (2019), https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/20
20/02/FY-2019-Annual-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6F7-8FZ8].
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